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Abstract: Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks?  This 
paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the 
ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank 
valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not 
widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash-flow 
rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase 
valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder 
protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of 
minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and 
concentrated cash-flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the 
evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will 
increase the market valuation of banks. 
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Research suggests that well-functioning banks promote growth.
1 When banks efficiently 
mobilize and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms and accelerates capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. Furthermore, banks, as major creditors and in some countries as 
major equity holders, play an important role in governing firms. Thus, if bank managers face sound 
governance mechanisms, this enhances the likelihood that banks will raise capital inexpensively, 
allocate society’s savings efficiently, and exert sound governance over the firms they fund. 
Nevertheless, little is known about which laws, bank supervisory strategies, and bank 
regulations enhance the governance and functioning of banks. Virtually all countries adopted the Basle 
Committee’s original recommendations on capital regulations and official supervision, and most have 
indicated their intention to adopt the much more detailed set of recommendations contained in Basel II. 
Yet, there exists no cross-country evidence regarding the impact of capital standards and bank 
supervision and regulation on the market value of banks. Regarding shareholder protection laws, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002, henceforth LLSV) examine the impact of these 
laws on corporate valuations. Yet, there is no evidence on whether shareholder protection laws 
influence the corporate governance of opaque, heavily regulated banks differently from other 
industries.
2 Given the importance of banks in the economy, it is crucial to understand which laws and 
regulations improve the governance of banks. 
This paper assesses the impact of shareholder protection laws, bank supervision and regulation, 
and the ownership structure of banks on bank valuations. By examining valuations, we directly analyze 
banks’ cost of capital and indirectly assess the market’s assessment of the governance of banks. That 
                                                 
1 See, King and Levine (1993a,b), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Wurgler (2000), Claessens and Laeven (2003), 
and reviews by Levine (1997, 2004). 
2 Akerlof and Romer (1993) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) examine the expropriation of bank 





is, holding other things constant, governance mechanisms that both reduce the ability of insiders to 
expropriate bank resources and promote bank efficiency tend to boost the market value of banks. 
In terms of shareholder protection laws, research suggests that strong legal protection of small 
investors increases firm valuations (Claessens et al., 2000; LLSV, 2002). In short, investors pay more 
for equity when legal institutions effectively protect their rights. From this perspective, investor 
protection laws may provide the tools for small shareholders to stop large shareholders from 
expropriating bank resources. We define expropriation broadly to include theft, transfer pricing, asset 
stripping, the hiring of family members, the allocation of credit in a manner that enriches bank insiders 
but hurts the bank as a whole, and other “perquisites” that benefit bank insiders but hurt the bank. 
In the particular case of banks, however, not everyone agrees that shareholder protection laws 
will effectively thwart expropriation.
3 Many view banks as extraordinarily complex and opaque 
(Morgan, 2003). Thus, investor protection laws alone may not provide a sufficiently powerful 
corporate governance mechanism to small shareholders. Put differently, even with strong investor 
protection laws, small stakeholders may lack the means to monitor and govern complex banks. 
Furthermore, bank regulations may be sufficiently pervasive that they render shareholder protection 
laws superfluous, or bank regulations may supersede standard investor protection laws. Thus, the 
impact of investor protection laws on banks may differ from their impact on non-bank corporations. 
This paper provides the first examination of the impact of shareholder protection laws on bank 
valuations under different bank supervisory and regulatory regimes. 
In terms of bank supervision and regulation, official oversight of banks may arise in part to stop 
bank insiders from expropriating bank resources (Caprio and Levine 2002). Thus, effective supervision 
and regulation may increase investor confidence regarding expropriation and boost market valuations. 
                                                 
3 Coasians argue that legal systems that effectively enforce private contracts will allow sophisticated financial market 
participants to custom design a vast array of private contracts to ameliorate complex agency problems better than 





Of course, bank supervision and regulation arise for reasons other than reducing expropriation. 
Especially in the presence of deposit insurance, supervision and regulation may arise to reduce 
excessive risk-taking by bank owners and protect depositors. In this context, supervision and 
regulation could actually reduce bank valuations by forcing bank risk below what equity holders would 
choose in the presence of government insurance. In this paper, we provide the first cross-country 
assessment of the impact of supervision and regulation on bank valuations. 
  While not mutually exclusive, shareholder protection laws and official supervision/regulation 
emphasize very different roles for the government, and our analysis, therefore, speaks directly to 
ongoing debates regarding the Basel Committee’s recommendations on bank supervision/regulation. 
The official supervision/regulation mechanism focuses on capital regulations and empowering official 
supervision and regulation of banks, which compose the first two pillars of Basel II. In contrast, the 
shareholder protection mechanism focuses on empowering the private sector, which is related to Basel 
II’s third pillar on private monitoring. We provide some evidence on the influence of each of these 
corporate governance mechanisms on bank valuations. 
  To draw precise inferences regarding the impact of legal protection and regulations on bank 
valuations, we need to consider ownership structure since ownership structure is an additional, and 
perhaps interrelated, mechanism for exerting corporate control. A crucial agency problem is the ability 
of controlling owners to expropriate – often legally  -- corporate resources. The incentives of the 
controlling shareholders to expropriate resources from the corporation, however, depend on their cash-
flow rights. As their cash-flow rights rise, expropriation involves a greater reduction in their own cash 
flow. Since expropriation is costly, increases in the cash-flow rights of the controlling owner will 
reduce incentives to expropriate resources from the corporation holding other factors constant (Jensen 





ownership on bank values, concentration may also influence the impact of legal protection on bank 
valuations (LLSV, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). These models suggest that a marginal 
improvement in legal protection may have less of an impact on bank valuations when there is a 
controlling shareholder. Or, put differently, these models predict that with effective legal protection of 
minority shareholders, having a controlling shareholder is less important for stemming the 
expropriation of the minority shareholders’ wealth.  
  One contribution of this paper is to assemble and analyze detailed data on the ownership of 
banks around the world. Are banks widely held, or do they tend to have controlling owners?  If they 
have a controlling owner, who tends to control banks?  LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, 
henceforth LLS) show that the widely held corporation is the exception rather than the norm 
internationally. Rather, they show that families or the State typically control firms. While there are 
financial institutions in LLS’s (1999) sample, they do not focus on detailing the ownership structure of 
banks in each country and their coverage of commercial banks is limited.
4 In this paper, we construct a 
new database covering 244 banks across 44 countries and trace the ownership of banks to identify the 
ultimate owners of bank capital and the degree of voting rights and cash-flow rights concentration. As 
defined in greater detail below, an owner’s voting rights will exceed the owner’s cash-flow rights when 
the owner controls votes through various affiliated parties without having the rights to all cash flows 
received by those affiliated parties. 
Thus, we provide information on three questions concerning ownership. First, we assess 
whether banks are widely held or whether they have a controlling owner with significant control and 
cash-flow rights. We find that banks are generally not widely held. In our average country, only about 
25 percent of the banks are widely held, i.e., they do not have a shareholder that owns at least 10 
                                                 
4 Similarly, while LLS (2002) and Barth et al. (2001, 2003) provide statistics on the degree of State ownership of banks, 





percent of the voting rights. Second, we provide information on the identity of the controlling 
shareholder. For banks with a controlling shareholder, we find that the controlling owner is a family 
more than half of the time in the average country, while we identify the State as the controlling owner 
of banks 19 percent of the time. Finally, we assess whether laws regarding the protection of minority 
shareholders and bank supervisory and regulatory practices are associated with the degree of control 
rights and cash-flow rights concentration. The data indicate that stronger legal protection of 
shareholders is positively connected with countries having more widely held banks. 
  Given this information on bank ownership, we examine the legal and regulatory determinants 
of bank valuations. Specifically, using bank-level data, we evaluate the impact of the legal protection 
of minority shareholders, bank supervisory and regulatory policies, and ownership structure on bank 
valuations. To measure valuation, we use both Tobin’s Q and the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity. We also test whether ownership concentration affects the impact of laws on 
bank valuations. 
  There are four key results on the governance of banks. First, stronger legal protection of 
minority shareholders is associated with more highly valued banks. This suggests both that 
expropriation of minority shareholders is important in many countries and that legal mechanisms can 
restrict expropriation of bank resources.  
Second, bank regulations and supervisory practices have little impact on bank valuations. 
Specifically, empowering the public sector through strong supervisory agencies does not influence 
bank valuations and regulatory restrictions on bank capital, the entry of new banks, and bank activities 
in securities markets, insurance, and real estate do not boost bank values. Also, even when we dissect 
the different channels through which supervision/regulation may influence the governance of banks, 





reducing expropriation and a countervailing negative impact on bank valuations by reducing bank risk 
below the level desired by shareholders. The findings on laws and supervision/regulation are consistent 
with the view that legal empowerment of small, private investors is a more efficacious governance 
mechanism that boosts bank valuations than official supervision and regulation of banks. 
Third, the degree of cash-flow rights of the largest owner enters the bank valuation equation 
positively. The evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions that concentrated ownership reduces 
incentives for insiders to expropriate bank resources, and this boosts valuations. 
Fourth, large cash-flow rights reduce the impact of legal protection on valuations. Thus, a 
marginal improvement in legal protection has less of an impact on a bank’s valuation as the controlling 
owner’s cash-flow rights increases. Put differently, a marginal increase in ownership concentration has 
a particularly large impact on valuations when legal protection of minority shareholders is weak. These 
last two findings shed a skeptical light on regulatory strategies that seek to minimize ownership 
concentration, especially in environments with weak legal protection of minority shareholders. 
  This paper is related to a number of influential bodies of research. First, there is a large 
literature on the impact of ownership structure on valuations. Some explicitly model the expropriation 
of minority shareholders by those exploiting “benefits of control” (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Stulz, 
1988; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997, 1998; and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Others seek to 
explain the equilibrium structure of ownership and firm valuation under different shareholder 
protection environments (Zingales, 1995; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Empirically, researchers 
examine the impact of managerial ownership on corporate valuations (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; and Holderness, Kroszner, and 
Sheehan, 1999). Work also finds that weaker shareholder protection increases the premium associated 





Zingales, 1994). In this paper, we focus on how legal protection of minority shareholders, bank 
supervisory and regulatory practices, and ownership concentration interact to influence bank 
valuations. Most directly, our paper extends LLS’s (1999) examination of corporate ownership around 
the world and LLSV’s (2000) examination of corporate valuations to the case of commercial banks 
while also assessing the impact of bank supervisory and regulatory policies on bank valuations 
  The paper also contributes to the debate on banking sector policies. Basic theories of regulation 
suggest that if small stakeholders lack the means to monitor banks, then government supervision can 
improve welfare (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). But theory also suggests that government agencies will 
act in their own interests, not necessarily in the interests of society (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Stigler, 
1972, 1975). Empirically, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) find that bank development is (a) 
positively associated with policies that empower private monitoring and (b) negatively associated with 
powerful supervisory agencies. They also find no evidence that powerful supervisors promote bank 
stability. Furthermore, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) find that (a) firms in countries with 
powerful supervisory agencies tend to face greater external financing obstacles, but (b) national 
policies that empower private monitoring of banks ease corporate financing obstacles.
5 This paper 
contributes to the debate on which public policies enhance the governance of banks.   
  Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 analyses bank ownership around the world. Section 4 
examines bank valuations. Section 5 provides extensions and robustness tests and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 





II. Data and Variables 
A. Sample 
To conduct our analyses, we build a database on bank ownership, bank valuations, and other 
bank-specific and country characteristics. As discussed below, information on bank ownership is 
particularly difficult to construct. Data permitting, we collect data on the 10 largest publicly listed 
banks (as defined by total assets at the end of 2001) in those countries for which LLSV (1998) 
assembled data on shareholder rights.
6  Since some countries have fewer than 10 publicly listed banks 
with stock market valuations, this yields 281 banks.  Then, we lose 25 banks because of missing 
information on the book value of assets and 12 banks because of missing ownership data. The final 
sample consists of 244 banks across 44 countries.
7 
  Focusing on the largest banks enhances comparability across countries. Also, the largest banks 
tend to have the most liquid shares, reducing concerns that liquidity differences drive the results. As 
noted by LLSV (2002), focusing on the largest corporations should bias the results against finding a 
relationship between the formal legal protection of minority shareholders and valuations because larger 
corporations face alternative governance mechanisms, such as public scrutiny, foreign shareholders, 
and listings on international exchanges.
8 
                                                 
6 There are five countries for which LLSV (1998) collected data on shareholder protection laws but which do not have 
sufficient information on bank ownership or the market valuation of banks to be included in our analyses (Belgium, 
Ecuador, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uruguay). We examine the ownership of the bank holding company, not the bank 
itself, because bank holding company shares are publicly traded and bank holding companies control virtually all of the 
shares of their banks. For example, we examine Citigroup, not Citibank. If a bank is cross-listed in more than one 
exchange, we use market valuations from the exchange where the bank (or bank holding company) is registered. 
7 The sample accounts for on average 83 percent of total banking system assets across the 44 countries.  In only five 
countries, does our sample cover less than 50 percent of the total banking assets of the country reported by the country’s 
supervisory agency (Argentina, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, and Venezuela).  When we eliminate these countries, the results 
are unchanged. 
8 Recent work on the ownership of non-financial corporations has focused on the 10 or 20 largest firms for the same reasons 
(LLS, 1999; LLSV, 2002). Since there are significantly fewer banks than non-financial firms, our 10-banks-per-country 






Banking data come from two major sources. BANKSCOPE, maintained by Bureau Van Dijk, 
contains financial and ownership information for about 4,000 major banks. BANKERS ALMANAC, 
published since 1847, also contains a wealth of data, including detailed ownership data.
9   
To obtain ownership information of banks, we also use annual reports, 20-F filings for 
companies with American Depositary Receipts, proxy statements, and country-specific publications. 
Also, many individual banks and national institutions (e.g., Central Banks, regulatory authorities) 
maintain websites that we used to compile ownership data. 
Since (1) non-financial institutions own bank shares, (2) BANKSCOPE and the BANKERS 
ALMANAC only have information on financial institutions, and (3) we seek to trace bank ownership 
through corporations back to individuals, we need information on the ownership of non-financial 
institutions. WORLDSCOPE contains ownership data of firms. Thus, we use WORLDSCOPE along 
with 20-F filings, company reports, and filings with national stock exchanges and securities regulations 
to identify the ultimate owners of corporations that own shares in banks. The ownership data are from 
2001 except in a few cases, where we use 2000 data. Because ownership patterns are very stable, this 
should neither induce problems, nor bias the results. 
C. Control rights 
We classify a bank as having a controlling owner if the shareholder has direct and indirect 
voting rights that sum to 10 percent or more. If no shareholder holds 10 percent of the voting rights, we 
classify the bank as widely held. Since 10 percent voting rights is frequently sufficient to exert control, 
this cut-off is used extensively (e.g., LLS, 1999; LLSV, 2002). When we use a 20 percent criterion, 
however, we obtain the same conclusions as those discussed below.   
                                                 





While direct ownership involves shares registered in the shareholder’s name, indirect 
ownership involves bank shares held by entities that the ultimate shareholder controls. Since the 
principal shareholders of banks are frequently themselves financial institutions or corporate entities, 
we find the major shareholders in these financial institutions or corporate entities. Often, we need to 
trace this indirect ownership chain backwards through numerous corporations to identify the ultimate 
controllers of the votes. Thus, to construct data on control rights of banks, we follow LLS’s (1999) and 
LLSV’s (2002) procedure for examining the ownership of firms. Lang and So (2002) also construct 
data on bank ownership. They do not, however, examine the impact of shareholder protection laws, 
bank supervision and regulation, and cash-flow rights on bank valuations. 
Mechanically, we first identify all major shareholders who control over 5 percent of the votes. 
We use 5 percent because (1) it provides a significant threshold and (2) most countries do not mandate 
disclosure of ownership shares below 5 percent. Given these major shareholders, we then begin our 
search for indirect chains of control. 
Next, if these major shareholders are themselves (financial or non-financial) corporations, we 
find the major shareholders of these financial or non-financial corporations. We continue this search 
until we find the ultimate owners of the votes. For example, a shareholder has x percent indirect 
control over bank A if she controls directly firm B (i.e., if she holds at least 10 percent of the voting 
rights of firm B) that, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes of bank A. As another example, a 
shareholder has x percent indirect control over bank A if she controls directly firm C that, in turn, 
controls directly firm B, which directly controls x percent of the votes of bank A. The control chain 
from bank A to firm C can be a long sequence of firms, each of which has control (greater than 10 





and the bank, we sum the control rights across all of these chains. When multiple shareholders have 
over 10 percent of the votes, we pick the largest controlling owner.
10 
After going through this search process, we divide banks into six categories. First, widely held 
banks do not have a controlling owner, i.e., no legal entity owns 10 percent or more of the voting 
rights. Second, there are then five distinct categories of controlling owners who own a minimum of 10 
percent of the voting rights of the bank: (1) a family (or individual), (2) the State, (3) a voting trust, 
foundation, etc. (4) a widely held (non-financial) corporation, and (5) a widely held financial 
institution. We use separate categories for widely held corporations and financial institutions since 
these two ownership forms may be of separate interest. 
It is not entirely clear whether banks controlled by widely held (financial or non-financial) 
corporations should be classified as having a controlling owner, which is what we do. A bank 
controlled by a widely held corporation can either be considered as controlled by the corporation’s 
management or widely held since the management of the corporation is not accountable to an ultimate 
owner. We follow LLSV (2002) and classify banks as having a controlling owner if the ultimate owner 
is a widely held financial or non-financial corporation. Moreover, we confirm the results when using 
alternative classifications of a controlling owner as reported below.  
We now define the specific variables associated with control as follows, which are also 
described in Table I. Table II provides summary statistics. 
WIDELY is a dummy variable that equals one if no legal entity owns 10 percent or more of the 
voting rights, and zero otherwise.  
CONTROL equals the fraction of the bank’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling 
shareholder.  
                                                 
10 As a sensitivity check, we did  the analyses while also including an indicator of whether a bank has multiple controlling 





FAMILY is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual or family is the controlling 
shareholder, and zero otherwise.  
STATE is a dummy variable that equals one if the state (or a foreign state) is the controlling 
shareholder, and zero otherwise.  
FIN is a dummy variable that equals one if a widely held financial corporation is the controlling 
shareholder, and zero otherwise.  
CORP is a dummy variable that equals one if a widely held non-financial corporation is the 
controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Note, “widely-held” means that there is no owner with 10 
percent or more of the voting rights.  
OTHER is a dummy variable that equals one if the controlling owner is a trust, foundation, etc. 
For example, the largest Dutch bank, ABN AMRO Bank N.V., falls into the category OTHER because 
the majority of its voting rights are held by a foundation (“Stichting” in Dutch).  
D. Cash-flow rights 
We also compute the direct and indirect cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder (CF). 
The shareholder may hold cash-flow rights directly and indirectly. For example, if the controlling 
shareholder of bank A holds the fraction y of cash-flow rights in firm B and firm B in turn holds the 
fraction x of the cash-flow rights in Bank A, then the controlling shareholder’s indirect cash-flow 
rights in bank A are equal to the product of x and y. If there is a chain of controlling ownership, then 
we use the products of the cash-flow rights along the chain. To compute the controlling shareholder’s 
total cash-flow rights we sum direct and all indirect cash-flow rights.  
CF equals the fraction of the bank’s cash-flow rights owned directly and indirectly by its 





Note, there can be important differences between cash-flow rights and control rights when there 
are indirect chains of control. As a simple example, consider a shareholder who owns 10 percent of the 
voting rights and cash-flow rights of firm A, and firm A in turn holds 20 percent of the voting rights 
and cash-flow rights of bank B. Assume that this shareholder (i) does not own direct shares in bank B 
and does not have control or cash-flow rights of bank B through other indirect chains of control and (ii) 
is the largest equity holder of firm A. In our calculations, this shareholder has 20 percent control rights 
of bank B because the shareholder controls firm A and firm A has 20 percent of the voting rights of the 
bank. This shareholder’s cash-flow rights, however, equals 2 percent because the shareholder only 
receives 2 percent of the bank’s dividends (20% * 10%). As robustness check we also computed the 
wedge, which equals the difference between control rights and cash-flow rights, and included this in 
the regressions.  The wedge does not enter significantly, nor does it change any of the results reported 
below. 
E. Bank valuations and loan growth 
  We use two indicators of bank valuation.  Table II provides summary statistics and Table III 
lists the averages for each country’s banks.  
TOBIN’S Q is the traditional measure of valuation and is calculated as the ratio of the market 
value of equity plus the book value of liabilities to the book value of assets. 
MARKET-TO-BOOK equals the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of 
equity. We use this because banks are highly leveraged. 
  LOAN GROWTH equals the growth rate of the bank’s loan portfolio over the last three years. 
As discussed below, we use this to control for cross-bank differences in growth, which may influence 
bank valuations.  As robustness checks, we also include contemporaneous loan growth, as well as 





F. Shareholder rights, supervision, and regulation 
This paper examines the impact of the legal protection of shareholders and official bank 
supervisory and regulatory practices on bank valuations.  
RIGHTS is the LLSV (1998) index of the legal protection of shareholders across countries. 
This index ranges from zero to six, where larger values indicate greater legal protection of shareholder 
rights. Table I gives a detailed definition and Table II provides summary statistics. 
To study the supervisory and regulatory environment, we use an assortment of indicators from 
the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004) database. A growing number of papers use the information 
contained in this dataset to examine the impact of bank supervision and regulatory policies on bank 
performance, stability, and corporate finance (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a,b; 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2003, and citations therein). Table II gives summary statistics 
and the values for each country are reported in Table III. 
OFFICIAL is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency. As specified 
in Table I, OFFICIAL includes information on the rights of the supervisory agency to meet with, 
demand information from, and take legal action against auditors; to force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure, management, directors, etc.; to oblige the bank to provision against potential 
losses and suspend dividends, bonuses, and management fees; and to supersede the rights of 
shareholders and intervene in a bank and/or declare a bank insolvent. We include this variable since 
greater bank supervisory/regulatory power may reduce insiders from exploiting minority investors in 
the bank.
11   
                                                 
11 We also conduct the analyses using components of OFFICIAL that focus only on the disciplinary powers of the 
supervisory agency. That is, we include information on the power of the supervisory agency to force a bank to change its 
internal organizational structure, management, directors, etc.; to oblige the bank to provision against potential losses, and 
suspend dividends, bonuses, and management fees; and to supersede the rights of shareholders and intervene in a bank 





RESTRICT is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. This index 
measures regulatory impediments to banks engaging in (1) securities market activities (e.g., 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), (2) Insurance activities 
(e.g., insurance underwriting and selling), (3) Real estate Activities (e.g., real estate investment, 
development, and management), and (4) the ownership of nonfinancial firms. Limiting the range of 
activities in which banks can participate is one potential mechanism for limiting the ability of insiders 
to expropriate bank resources (Boyd, Chang, and Smith, 1998). 
CAPITAL is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. As described in Table I, this 
index includes information on whether the source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include 
assets other than cash, government securities, or borrowed funds, and whether the authorities verify the 
sources of capital. CAPITAL also includes information on the extent of regulatory requirements 
regarding the amount of capital banks must hold. One rationale for imposing strict capital regulations 
is to improve governance. 
INDEPENDENCE is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) find that an independent supervisory agency reduces political 







III. Bank Ownership around the World 
A. Ownership of publicly traded banks 
Table III provides information on (1) the extent to which banks are widely held and (2) the 
identity of the controlling owner if the banks is not widely held. Panel A provides country averages. 
Thus, the data indicate that although more than 90 percent of the banks in Canada, Ireland, and the 
United States (in our sample) are widely held, 21 out of 44 countries do not have a single widely held 
bank (among their largest banks). Overall, the cross-country average for widely held is only 25 
percent, so that in the average country, 75 percent of the largest, listed banks have a controlling 
shareholder. 
  Besides indicating that widely held banks are the exception rather than the rule, the data also 
suggest that family ownership of banks is very important across countries (Table III). In the average 
country, a family is the controlling owner in 52 percent of those banks with a controlling owner. In 17 
countries, families (FAMILY) control 50 percent or more of the banks in our sample. 
  Further, note that the State is an important owner of banks in some countries. While the State is 
not a controlling owner in any bank in 29 countries, the State is the controlling owner in more than half 
of the sampled banks in Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. Given the potentially enormous 
impact of state ownership, we examine this specifically below. 
  Panels B and C of Table III provide information on the ownership patterns of banks across (i) 
national differences in the legal protection of shareholders and (ii) cross-country differences in bank 
supervision and regulation. Specifically, for shareholder rights, we split the sample into countries with 
above-median shareholder rights and below-median shareholder rights. Then Panel B provides means 
for these sub-groups, while Panel C tests whether the ownership patterns differ between high and low 





sample according to each supervisory/regulatory variable and then test for cross-median differences in 
bank ownership patterns. 
  The Panel C results in Table III indicate that countries with below-median legal protection of 
shareholders have a significantly lower fraction of widely held banks than countries with above-
median legal protection. This is consistent with the view that greater legal protection of shareholders 
makes potential investors confident that insiders will not exploit them and hence facilitates more 
dispersed ownership of banks.  These same patterns emerge when using a 20 percent cut-off for 
classifying a bank as having a controlling owner. 
  The results also indicate that countries with above-median official supervisory power and 
capital restrictions do not have a larger fraction of widely held banks. This does not support the notion 
that greater supervisory power and stricter capital regulations make small investors confident that 
insiders will not exploit them.  
B. Control rights and cash flows of banks 
Table III also provides summary statistics on the control and cash-flow rights of banks around 
the world. The control rights variable (CONTROL) equals the percentage of voting rights held by the 
controlling owner. Cash-flow rights equals the cash-flow rights of the controlling owner. 
Panel A of Table III advertises the importance of incorporating the degree of ownership 
concentration in our analyses of the governance of banks. There is enormous cross-country variation in 
the average degree of control rights and cash-flow rights in our sample of 244 banks. In 14 out of 44 
countries, the controlling owner averages more than 50 percent of the voting shares. But, in Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, there either is no bank with a controlling 





rights, half of the countries have bank systems where the controlling owner, if any, holds 25 percent or 
more on average of the bank’s cash-flow rights. 
Table III’s Panels B and C provide information on the how control rights and cash-flow rights 
differ across different legal and regulatory regimes. The results indicate that countries with below-
median legal protection of shareholders have banks where, on average, the controlling owner holds a 
significantly larger fraction of the voting and the cash-flow rights than in countries with above the 
median legal protection of shareholders. Indeed, the voting rates of the controlling owners are nearly 
twice as large in countries with below-median shareholder rights. This is consistent with the view that 
weak legal protection of shareholders makes potential small investors insecure about their rights and 
hence fosters more concentrated ownership of banks. 
The results in Table III Panel C further show that countries with above-median official 
supervisory power and capital restrictions do not have lower control and cash-flow rights, which does 
not support the view that supervisory power and capital requirements reduce the ability of insiders to 
exploit outsiders. The data do, however, indicate that regulatory restrictions on banks and low 
supervisory independence are associated with greater control and cash-flow rights. These results 
certainly do not support the view that tighter government regulation of banks will increase the 
confidence of small investors in the governance of banks. 
 
IV. Legal Protection, Supervision, Ownership and Bank Valuation 
A. Preliminary  results on bank valuation 
Before turning to the regression results, we first summarize the association between measures 
of the market valuation of banks and indicators of (i) the legal protection of minority shareholders and 





variables. Panels B and C provide information on the how the bank valuation measures differ across 
different legal and regulatory regimes. As discussed above, we split the sample into countries with 
above-median shareholder rights and below-median shareholder rights and analyze bank valuations. 
Similarly, for each bank regulatory and supervisory indicator, we split the sample into countries with 
above-median values and below-median values for these indicators. Panel B provides summary 
statistics and Panel C tests whether bank valuation differs significantly across these legal and 
regulatory characteristics. 
Table IV Panel C indicates that countries with low levels of shareholder rights have 
significantly lower bank valuations as measured by both market-to-book value and by Tobin’s Q. This 
is consistent with the view that investors in countries with weak shareholder rights are willing to pay 
less for banks than potential shareholders in countries with strong shareholder rights.  
The tests in Table IV Panel C indicate that bank valuations do not differ significantly across 
high and low levels of both official supervisory power and capital restrictions. These summary 
statistics do not indicate that investors in countries with powerful supervisory agencies or stringent 
capital requirements are willing to pay more for banks than countries with weaker supervisory agencies 
and less stringent capital requirements. This initial look at the data also does not support the view that 
powerful official supervision increases fears that the government will expropriate bank resources with 
adverse implications on bank valuations. Interestingly, countries with fewer restrictions on bank 
activities tend to have higher bank valuations than countries that impose greater regulatory restrictions 
on bank activities. Also, supervisory independence is positively associated with bank valuations. 
Finally, while unreported, reduced form regressions of bank valuations on shareholder rights and the 
bank supervisory/regulatory variables indicate a strong positive relationship between bank valuations 





B. Regression  results 
To assess the impact of governance mechanisms on bank valuations, we regress bank valuation 
on the legal protection of minority shareholders, bank supervision and regulation policies, the cash 
flow and control rights of controlling shareholders, bank-specific traits, and various interaction terms.  
We estimate all regressions using country random effects. Fixed effects are not feasible in our 
setup given that there is no within-country variation in the shareholder rights and bank 
supervision/regulation variables. Below, however, we control for an array of country-specific 
characteristics such as the level of economic and institutional development, differences in legal system 
design, the level of corruption, and differences in deposit insurance policies.  The random effects 
specification is supported by Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier tests, which strongly 
reject the null hypothesis that errors are independent within countries. The random effects estimator 
does not treat banks within a country as independent observations and therefore adjusts the standard 
errors to reflect the cross-correlation produced by common country components. 
We control for net loan growth (LOAN GROWTH), the degree of state ownership of banks, 
and a wide-array of control variables in the regressions. LOAN GROWTH proxies for a bank’s growth 
opportunities. In many countries, government owned banks play a large role in the banking sector. If 
the state controls the bank, it may exert different influences over the bank from those exerted by a 
private controlling owner (LLS, 2002). We therefore add a dummy variable that equals one if the state 
is the controlling owner of the bank, and zero otherwise. In robustness tests, we also control for the 





entry from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) database.
12 Furthermore, as described below, we 
include an assortment of other bank-specific and country-specific controls. 
Table V examines the relationship between bank valuation (MARKET-TO-BOOK) and 
shareholder rights (RIGHTS), cash-flow rights (CF), and the interaction between shareholder rights 
and cash-flow rights (CF*RIGHTS), while controlling for net loan growth (LOAN GROWTH) and 
whether the state is the controlling shareholder (STATE).
13 Due to missing observations on LOAN 
GROWTH, we have a maximum of 42 countries and 213 banks in the Table V regressions.  
The Table V regressions provide three key results on the links between bank valuation, bank 
ownership, and the legal protection of minority shareholders. First, higher levels of cash-flow rights by 
a controlling shareholder boost bank valuations. This is consistent with theories predicting that the 
incentives for controlling owners to exploit the benefits of control diminish as cash-flow rights 
increase. Second, greater legal protection of minority shareholders rights improves the valuation of 
banks. This is consistent with the view that weak protection of minority shareholders will induce the 
marginal small investor to pay less for bank equity. Third, greater cash-flow rights by a controlling 
shareholder is particularly positive for the valuation of banks in countries with weak legal protection of 
minority shareholder rights. Thus, the interaction term (CF*RIGHTS) enters negatively and highly 
significantly. Put differently, high levels of cash-flow rights are less important for the valuation of 
banks in countries with strong minority shareholder rights. While the first two results are consistent 
with LLSV’s (2002) finding on non-financial corporations, the strong, robust results on the interaction 
term are consistent with the theory in LLSV (2002) but more robust than their empirical findings for 
                                                 
12 Specifically, we include (i) an index of the number of regulatory procedures required to obtain a banking license and (ii) 
an indicator of the fraction of bank entry applications that the country’s regulatory agency denies. Including these variables 
does not alter any of this paper’s findings. 
13 Some suggest that the State controls banks when the State owns more than 50 percent of the shares (LLS, 2002; Barth, et 
al., 2003). Thus, we conducted the analyses using this definition as a control variable in the regressions. This does not 





non-financial corporations. The loan growth and state ownership variables do not enter significantly, 
and we obtain qualitatively very similar results if we exclude LOAN GROWTH or STATE from the 
regressions. 
Economically, the direct impact of cash flow concentration and shareholder protection on bank 
valuations can be very large.  For instance, using regression 4 in Table V, the direct (i.e., excluding the 
interaction term) impact of a one-standard deviation increase in shareholder protection laws (1.25) 
equals 0.28, which is 21 percent of the mean value of the market-to-book value in our sample of banks.  
Similarly, the direct impact of a one-standard deviation increase in cash-flow rights (0.27) equals 0.42, 
which is 31 percent of the mean value of the market-to-book value.  When accounting for the 
interaction term, there exist circumstances when a marginal increase in shareholder protection laws or 
cash-flow rights will decrease the market-to-book value.  For example, if shareholder protection laws 
are high (4), then a one-standard deviation increase in CF will induce a drop in the market-to-book 
value of 0.21, which is 15 percent of the mean value of the market-to-book value in our sample of 
banks. 
In Table VI, we also include the supervision/regulation variables. Thus, we assess whether 
commercial bank regulations and supervisory strategies influence bank valuations. By adding the 
supervision/regulation variables, we also test the robustness of the earlier findings on the legal rights of 
minority shareholders, cash-flow rights, and the interaction between cash-flow rights and shareholder 
rights. 
First, the Table VI results indicate that the earlier findings on shareholder rights and cash-flow 
rights are robust to including indicators of bank supervision and regulation. Including supervision and 





Second, the bank supervision and regulation variables do not enter significantly (Table VI). 
That is, the power of the supervisory agency to discipline and monitor banks, the stringency of capital 
requirements, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, and independence of the supervisory authority 
do not influence bank valuations. These findings are inconsistent with the view that powerful 
supervisory authorities, stringent capital standards, and regulations on bank activities reduce the fears 
that investors have about buying bank equity. Looked at differently, the findings are also inconsistent 
with (i) the view that powerful supervision provides mechanisms for governments to expropriate bank 
resources with negative ramifications on bank valuations and (ii) the argument that powerful 
supervision creates such an excessive burden on banks that it lowers their valuations. Rather, the Table 
VI results emphasize the importance of shareholder protection laws in boosting the confidence of 
shareholders. 
V. Extensions and Robustness 
A. Supervision/Regulation: Expropriation, Risk Reduction, and Institutions 
This sub-section presents three extensions of the results on official supervision and regulation 
of banks to examine whether bank supervision and regulation influence bank valuations under specific 
conditions. 
First, as discussed in the Introduction, supervision and regulation may influence bank 
valuations through at least two channels. Effective supervision/regulation may reduce fears of 
expropriation and thereby exert a positive influence on bank valuations. A second channel may also 
operate, however. Especially in the presence of deposit insurance, supervision/regulation may reduce 
bank risk below the level desired by shareholders and thereby exert a negative influence on bank 
valuations. Put differently, with government sponsored deposit insurance, bank shareholders will tend 





conditions, effective supervision/regulation will push bank risk below the level sought by shareholders 
with adverse implications on bank valuations. 
Although empirically Section IV found that the net impact of supervision/regulation on bank 
values is negligible, the net results may hide the separate impacts of supervision/regulation on 
expropriation and risk taking. Thus, supervision/regulation might effectively impede expropriation and 
reduce risk-taking but empirically we may be aggregating away these positive and negative effects on 
valuations. 
To address this concern, we examine an alternative econometric specification that allows 
supervision/regulation to exert a direct positive impact on valuations (to capture the expropriation 
channel) and an indirect negative impact on bank valuations (to capture the risk-reducing channel). In 
particular, we include an indicator of the generosity of the deposit insurance regime that was 
constructed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2003) and is termed MORAL HAZARD. Plus, we 
include the interaction term of MORAL HAZARD with the supervision/regulation variables. If the 
risk-reducing channel is important, then effective supervision/regulation should exert a more negative 
impact on valuations in the presence of a more generous, government-sponsored deposit insurance 
regime. Thus, if the risk-reducing channel is important, then the interaction term of MORAL 
HAZARD with the supervision/regulation variables should enter negatively. At the same time, if 
supervision/regulation effectively impedes expropriation, then the supervision/regulation variables 
should enter positively. Thus, we allow for both channels to operate. 
As shown in Table VII, even when we allow supervision/regulation to operate through both the 
expropriation and risk-reduction channels, we find no evidence that supervision/regulation induces a 
positive impact on bank valuations by reducing expropriation, nor do we find any evidence that the 





level desired by shareholders. Moreover, we continue to obtain the same conclusions on shareholder 
protection laws, cash-flow rights, and the interaction between shareholder protection laws and cash-
flow rights. While not capturing all mechanisms through which supervision/regulation may positively 
and negatively influence bank valuations, these results confirm and extend the paper’s initial results. 
The second extension of the results on bank supervision and regulation focuses on broad, 
national institutions. Perhaps supervision and regulation only improve the corporate governance of 
banks when there are good national institutions, such as low levels of government corruption, 
efficiently operating bureaucracies, or responsive political systems. To assess this possibility, we 
added an institutional indicator along with the interaction between the institutional indicator and the 
relevant supervisory/regulatory variable to the regressions in Table VI. As an institutional indicator, 
we used Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton’s (1999) aggregate institutional development index, 
which is calculated as the average of six indicators: voice and accountability in the political system, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the absence of official 
corruption. In no case did the bank supervision/regulation variables or the interaction term between 
institutional development and the bank supervision/ regulation variables enter significantly. Moreover, 
in no case did adding these variables alter the results on cash-flow rights, shareholder rights, or the 
interaction of shareholder rights and cash-flow rights. 
Third, it might be suggested that supervisory power, supervisory independence, regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities, and capital restrictions enhance the corporate governance of banks and 
thereby boost bank valuations only when shareholder protection laws (SRIGHTS) are weak. We tested 
this by adding the interaction term SRIGHTS multiplied by the relevant supervisory/regulatory 





or the interaction term enters significantly. Moreover, adding these interaction terms did not alter this 
paper’s other findings. 
B. Endogeneity 
We have assumed that cash-flow rights are exogenous. As argued by LLSV (2002), ownership 
patterns are very stable and largely determined by the particular histories of the corporations. 
Nevertheless, as shown, cash-flow rights vary systematically across countries, depending on national 
legal and regulatory systems. We address potential concerns about the endogeneity of cash-flow rights 
in two ways. 
First, we use bank-level instrumental variables for cash-flow rights (CF). It is difficult to 
construct instruments that both explain a bank’s cash-flow rights and are not affected by innovations in 
bank valuations. For each bank, we use the average cash-flow rights of the other banks in the country 
as an instrument for cash-flow rights. Thus, to the extent that there are industry and country factors that 
explain cash-flow rights, this instrument will capture these influences. At the same time, an innovation 
in the valuation of a particular bank will not necessarily influence the cash-flow rights of other banks. 
In practice, this instrument enters the first-stage regression for cash-flow rights significantly at the five 
percent level. Since the standard regressions also include the interaction term, CF*Rights, we 
instrument for this term as well. We include the interaction term Rights with the average cash flow of 
the other banks in the instrument set. This interaction term enters the first-stage regression for 
CF*Rights significantly at the five percent level. We conduct the instrumental variables analyses 
without loan growth in the regressions since loan growth is a bank-level variable and may also be 
subject to endogeneity concerns. Moreover, adding loan growth to the regressions does not 
qualitatively alter our conclusions, and as above, loan growth does not enter the regressions 





because we can only compute the cash flow instruments for countries with more than one bank. The 
instrumental variables results are based on the Baltagi (1981) two-stage least square random-effects 
estimator.  
The instrumental variable results in Table VIII confirm our earlier results: (i) the cash-flow 
rights variable enters positively and significantly, (ii) the shareholder rights variable enters positively 
and significantly, (iii) the interaction term between cash-flow rights and shareholder rights enters 
negatively and significantly, and (iv) the supervision/regulation variables do not enter significantly. 
As a second approach to endogeneity concerns, we can reduce potential endogeneity problems 
by focusing only on within-country variation in cash-flow rights. Thus, we de-mean the cash-flow 
rights variable by the country mean to focus only on cross-bank differences in cash-flow rights and 
abstract from cross-country differences in cash-flow rights. Using de-meaned cash flow, we confirm 
our earlier findings. De-meaned CF (CFD) and the interaction term (CFD*RIGHTS) continue to enter 
with significantly positive and negative coefficients, respectively. When using CFD, the results on 
RIGHTS weaken somewhat, implying that the inclusion of the cross-country component of CF is 
important for the significance of RIGHTS when including the interaction term between CFD and 
RIGHTS. In sum, these results with de-meaned CF suggest that our earlier findings – that (i) greater 
cash-flow rights boost bank valuations and (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws mitigate the need 
for concentrated cash-flow rights – do not seem to be driven by simultaneity bias since the findings 
hold when focusing solely on the within-country variation. 
Finally, we examine whether endogeneity is biasing the results on RIGHTS. We were 
concerned that a country-specific factor could be driving both the country-specific component of 





LLSV (1998) in using the legal origin of each country’s Commercial/Company law as an instrumental 
variable for RIGHTS. These instrumental variable results, however, confirm the paper’s findings. 
 
C. Controlling for other country-level and bank-level factors 
To assess whether the shareholder rights variable is proxying for some other country trait, we 
assess the robustness of the results to controlling for other country specific characteristics. Specifically, 
we include each country’s level of real per capita Gross Domestic Product (PER CAPITA INCOME), 
an index of contract enforcement (ENFORCE), an index of the degree of official corruption in the 
economy (where higher values indicate less corruption) (CORRUPT), an index of the law and order 
tradition of the country (LAW), and dummy variables for whether the country has a French legal origin 
(FRENCH LO) or an English legal origin  (ENGLISH LO). We include these indicators to control for 
the level of economic and institutional development and the design and operation of the legal system 
beyond specific shareholder protection laws.  If RIGHTS is simply proxying for “good” country-
specific traits that boost bank valuations, then these control variables should drive out the significance 
of RIGHTS in the valuation regressions.  As shown in Table IX, we obtain the same results when 
including these country-specific characteristics. 
We further assess the robustness of the results to controlling for additional bank-specific 
characteristics. In particular, bank size may influence valuations, so we include the logarithm of each 
bank’s total assets (SIZE). Furthermore, while we have controlled for average net loan growth over the 
three years prior to the valuation date (LOAN GROWTH), we also assess the robustness to including 
net loan growth during the year in which bank valuation is measured as well as current and lagged 
values of asset growth and revenue growth. Including these additional bank-level traits does not 






D. Re-defining variables and altering the sample 
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of the results to altering the definition of some of 
the key variables and to changing the sample of countries and banks. 
First, as noted above, some may argue the banks controlled by widely held financial or non-
financial corporations should be classified as widely held, not as having a controlling shareholder. 
Thus, as a robustness check, we reclassified banks. Banks were classified as having a controlling 
owner only if the controlling owner is a family or the state. Then, we use a dummy variable for state 
control in the regressions. This alternative definition of a controlling owner confirms the paper’s 
findings. 
Second, we examine control rights instead of cash-flow rights. Note theory focuses on cash-
flow rights. As cash-flow rights increase, expropriation by the controlling owner increasingly involves 
self-theft, so that stronger shareholder rights will exert less of a positive impact on bank valuations as 
the cash-flow rights of the controlling owner rises (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; and LLSV, 2002). 
Due to differences in control rights and cash-flow rights, control rights per se are logically not as 
directly linked to valuations. The results are consistent with these concepts. While shareholder rights, 
control rights, and the interaction term continue to enter with the same signs as the earlier results with 
cash-flow rights, the significance level is now weaker, especially on the interaction term between 
control rights and shareholder rights. Thus, as expected, the relationships among valuations, 
shareholder rights, and cash-flow rights are stronger than those with control rights. 
Third, instead of using ten percent of a bank’s voting rights as the minimum level necessary to 
be classified as having a controlling owner, we use twenty percent. This classifies more banks as 





Fourth, we examine Tobin’s Q as an alternative dependent variable instead of the simple 
market-to-book value of banks and obtain similar results.   
Fifth, we test whether the results hold when restricting the sample to only those banks with a 
controlling owner. Thus, we eliminate widely held banks from the analysis; we eliminate banks where 
CF equals zero. We confirm all conclusions using this sub-sample of banks. 
Sixth, we were concerned that some countries have many banks while others have few banks.  
Thus, we did the analyses excluding countries with only one bank. This did not change any of the 
results. Also, we did the analyses using weighted least squares, where we weighted observations by the 
inverse of the number of banks from the country in the sample. Again, this did not alter this paper’s 
findings. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper first constructed new data on the ownership of 244 banks in 44 countries and then 
(1) documented the ownership structure of banks around the world and (2) assessed different theories 
about the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and bank supervisory and regulatory 
policies for bank valuations.  
On ownership, we find that except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection 
laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, banks tend to be controlled by a family or the State.  
On valuations, we find that (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boosts 
valuations, (ii) weak shareholder protection laws lower bank valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow 
rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These 
results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders in banks is important 
internationally, that laws can play a role in restraining this expropriation, and concentrated cash-flow 





of checks, including controls for numerous country-specific and bank-specific characteristics, the use 
of different definitions for ownership control and bank valuations, and re-estimation using different 
samples of countries and banks. The public policy implications of this research should be treated 
cautiously, however. For example, just because legal institutions can restrain expropriation does not 
necessarily mean that changing statutes will reduce expropriation. As the institutional economics 
literature has stressed, the impact of simple changes, such as stroke-of-the-pen alterations to laws or 
regulations, depends on deeper institutional characteristics.  
Finally, we assess the relationship between bank supervision and regulation and the governance 
of banks. In contrast to Basel II’s first two pillars on capital requirements and official supervision, we 
do not find robust evidence that the stringency of capital requirements or official supervisory power 
influences bank valuations, nor do we find that regulatory restrictions on bank activities affect the 
market’s valuation of banks. Furthermore, we find no evidence that official supervision and regulation 
policies induce a positive impact on bank valuations by reducing fears of expropriation and a 
countervailing negative impact on bank valuations by reducing bank risk below the level desired by 
bank shareholders. Rather, consistent with Basel II’s third pillar on market monitoring, the results 
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Description of Variables 
 
This table describes the variables collected for the 44 countries included in our sample. We present the description and the 
sources of each variable. 
Variable Description 
Rights  Index of anti-director rights for the country. Formed by adding one when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting, (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed, (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital 
that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or 
equal to 10 percent (the sample median), or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights 
that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. The range for the index is from zero to 
six. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Market-to-book  The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Source: Bankscope 
(2003). 
Tobin’s Q  The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities to the book value 
of assets. Source: Bankscope (2003). 
Control  Fraction of the bank’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling shareholder. To 
measure control, we combine a shareholder’s direct (i.e., through shares registered in her 
name) and indirect (i.e., through shares held by entities that, in turn, she controls) voting 
rights in the banking firm. A shareholder has an x percent indirect control rights over a 
bank if (i) she controls directly firm A (i.e., she owns more than 10 percent of the voting 
rights of firm A) which, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes of the bank; or (ii) 
she controls directly firm B which in turn controls firm A (or any sequence of firms 
forming a control chain) which, in turn, controls x percent of the bank. Thus, the control 
chain can involve a sequence of companies linking the bank with the ultimate owner. A 
bank in our sample has a controlling shareholder if the sum of her direct and indirect voting 
rights exceeds 10 percent. When multiple shareholders meet our criteria for control, we 
assign control to the shareholder with the largest voting stake. Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on Bankscope, Worldscope, the Bankers Almanac, 20-F filings, and 
company websites. 
CF  Fraction of the firm’s ultimate cash-flow rights, if any, owned by its controlling 
shareholder. CF values are computed as the product of all the equity stakes along the 
control chain. See “Control” for a description of a control chain. The controlling 
shareholder may hold cash-flow rights directly (i.e., through shares registered in her name) 
and indirectly (i.e., through shares held by entities that, in turn, she controls). If there is a 
control chain, then we use the products of the cash-flow rights along the chain. For 
example, if the controlling shareholder of bank A holds the fraction y of cash-flow rights in 
firm B and firm B in turn holds the fraction x of the cash-flow rights in Bank A, then the 
controlling shareholder’s indirect cash-flow rights in bank A are equal to the product of x 
and y. To compute the controlling shareholder’s total cash-flow rights we sum direct and 
all indirect cash-flow rights. Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bankscope, 
Worldscope, the Bankers Almanac, 20-F filings, and company websites. 
Wedge  The difference between control rights and cash-flow rights. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Widely  Equals one if there is no controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
Family  Equals one if an individual or family is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
State  Equals one if a (foreign or domestic) state is the controlling shareholder, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Fin  Equals one if a widely held financial corporation is the controlling shareholder, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Authors’ calculations. 






zero otherwise. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Other  Other equals one if the controlling owner is not widely held, nor family-owned, nor state-
owned, or nor widely held by a financial or non-financial corporation, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Loan growth  The bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Source: Bankscope. 
State  Dummy variable that indicates whether the state is a major shareholder in the bank. Source: 
Authors’ calculations 
Official  Index of official supervisory power. Adds one for an affirmative response to each for the 
following 14 questions: 1.Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external 
auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? 2.Are auditors required by 
law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank 
directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3.Can supervisors 
take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 4.Can the supervisory authority 
force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 5.Are off-balance sheet items 
disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends?  b) 
Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8.Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this 
declaration supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? 9.Does the 
Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or 
all ownership rights-a problem bank? 10.Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, 
can the supervisory agency or any other government agency do the following: a) Supersede 
shareholder rights? b) Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). 
Restrict  Index of regulatory restrictions on banks ability to engage in securities market activities, 
the insurance business, conduct real estate activities, or own non-financial firms. Source: 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). 
Independence  The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and 
legally protected from the banking system. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). 
Capital  Regulatory restricts on bank capital. Index that includes information on the following 
questions. 1. Is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the 
Basel guidelines? 2. Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 3. Are 
market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? 4. Are 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? 5. Are unrealized foreign exchange 
losses deducted? 6. What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 7. Are 
the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
8. Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other 
than cash or government securities? 9. Can initial disbursement of capital be done with 
borrowed funds? Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). 
Moral hazard  Indicator of the generosity of the deposit insurance regime in the country. Source: 










This table reports summary statistics for the main variables. Market-to-book is the market-to-book value of the bank’s 
equity. Tobin’s Q is the bank’s Tobin’s q. Control is the fraction of the bank’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling 
shareholder. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the controlling owners and zero if there is no 
controlling owner. Widely held is a dummy variable that equals one if there is no controlling shareholder. Family is a 
dummy variable that equals one if an individual or family is the controlling shareholder. State is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the state is the controlling shareholder in the bank. Widely held financial is a dummy variable that equals 
one if a widely held financial corporation is the controlling shareholder. Widely held non-financial is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a widely held non-financial corporation is the controlling shareholder. Other is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the bank has another controlling owner. Rights is an index of anti-director rights for the country. Official is an index 
of official supervisory power. Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on banks ability to engage in non-banking 
activities or own non-financial firms. Independence is a measure of the degree to which the supervisory authority is 
independent from the government and legally protected from the banking system. Capital is a measure of regulatory 
restrictions on capital. Size is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Loan growth is the bank’s average net loan growth 
during the last 3 years. Current loan growth is the bank’s net loan growth during the current year. Panel A reports summary 
statistics and panel B reports the correlation matrix for the main regression variables. Table I defines and gives the sources 
of the variables. 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation Minimum  Maximum  Number of observations 
Market-to-book 1.341  0.760  0.216  3.946  244 
Tobin’s Q  1.020  0.060  0.859  1.373  244 
Control 0.326  0.308  0.000  1.000  244 
CF 0.260  0.274  0.000  1.000  244 
Widely 0.303  0.461  0.000  1.000  244 
Family 0.344  0.476  0.000  1.000  244 
State 0.180  0.385  0.000  1.000  244 
Fin 0.070  0.255  0.000  1.000  244 
Corp 0.012  0.110  0.000  1.000  244 
Other 0.094  0.293  0.000  1.000  244 
Rights 3.156  1.251  1.000  5.000  244 
Official 9.833  2.472  3.000  14.000  216 
Restrict 9.277  2.404  5.000  14.000  223 
Independence 2.579  1.101  1.000  4.000  216 
Capital 3.067  1.230  0.000  5.000  223 
Size 16.404  1.991  11.161  20.773  244 
Loan growth  0.055  0.138  -0.436  0.988  213 






Ownership and Control of Banks 
 
This table reports statistics on the ownership and control of publicly traded banks. Panel A presents country-averages for each ownership variable. We use 10 
percent as the criteria for control for a sample of the ten largest publicly traded banks in terms of total assets in each country at the end of December 2001, when 
available. Control is the fraction of the bank’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling shareholder. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow 
rights held by the controlling owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Widely held equals one if there is no 
controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Family equals one if an individual or family is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. State equals one if 
the state is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Fin equals one if a widely held financial corporation is the controlling shareholder, and zero 
otherwise. Corp equals one if a widely held non-financial corporation is the controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise. Other equals one if the bank has another 
controlling owner, and zero otherwise. N indicates for each country the number of banks in our sample. The sample includes the ten largest publicly traded banks 
in terms of total assets in each country at the end of December 2001, when available. Panel B classifies countries according to their ranking in shareholder rights 
or the bank supervision variables (above or below the sample median). Panel C reports test of means for low versus high values for shareholder rights and the 
bank regulatory variables. Table I defines the variables. * Significant at 10 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. *** Significant at 1 percent level. 
Country Control  CF  Widely  Family  State  Fin  Corp  Other    N 
  Panel A: Means            
Argentina  94.00  47.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1 
Australia 1.11  1.11  0.89  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  9 
Austria  55.33  40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.33  0.00  0.67  3 
Brazil  82.86  41.86 0.00 0.57 0.29  0.00  0.00  0.14  7 
Canada 0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  8 
Chile  53.00  24.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  4 
Colombia  45.50  40.50 0.25 0.50 0.00  0.00  0.25  0.00  4 
Denmark  20.22  17.11 0.22 0.11 0.00  0.22  0.00  0.44  9 
Egypt  27.00  17.25 0.00 0.25 0.75  0.00  0.00  0.00  4 
Finland  57.00  57.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  1 
France  40.33  40.33 0.50 0.00 0.00  0.50  0.00  0.00  6 
Germany 12.00  8.68  0.33  0.33  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.00  3 
Greece 33.00  33.00 0.13 0.38 0.50  0.00 0.00  0.00  8 
Hong  Kong  52.33  39.50 0.00 0.67 0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  6 
India  66.33  62.33 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  9 





Country Control  CF  Widely  Family  State  Fin  Corp  Other    N 
Ireland 0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.00    5 
Israel  43.00  43.00 0.00 0.63 0.25  0.00  0.00  0.13    8 
Italy  15.56  14.44 0.33 0.11 0.00  0.22  0.00  0.33    9 
Japan  11.20  11.20 0.80 0.00 0.00  0.20  0.00  0.00    5 
Jordan  25.29  23.00 0.00 0.71 0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00    7 
Kenya  18.00  18.00 0.25 0.25 0.25  0.00  0.00  0.25    4 
Korea  Rep.  Of  28.63  27.13 0.25 0.13 0.25  0.25  0.00  0.13    8 
Malaysia  39.00  30.60 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    5 
Mexico  60.00  58.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    1 
Netherlands  56.00  16.50 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00    2 
Norway 5.33  5.33  0.89  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.00  0.00    9 
Pakistan  40.00  40.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    1 
Peru  61.33  55.00 0.33 0.33 0.00  0.00  0.33  0.00    3 
Philippines  40.60  29.10 0.10 0.80 0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00    10 
Portugal  43.50  17.67 0.17 0.83 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    6 
Singapore  27.00  27.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    2 
South Africa  28.00  9.00  0.00  0.75  0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00    4 
Spain  31.60  17.90 0.20 0.40 0.10  0.00  0.00  0.30    10 
Sri  Lanka  18.60  13.80 0.40 0.00 0.40  0.20  0.00  0.00    5 
Sweden 17.67  8.67  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.67    3 
Switzerland  55.00  31.50 0.25 0.50 0.00  0.25  0.00  0.00    4 
Taiwan  24.60  22.50 0.40 0.20 0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00    10 
Thailand  52.00  52.00 0.00 0.43 0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00    7 
Turkey  62.29  58.71 0.00 0.86 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14    7 
United Kingdom  1.67  0.17  0.83  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    6 
United States  1.10  0.40  0.90  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    10 
Venezuela  29.00  29.00 0.50 0.50 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    2 
Zimbabwe 26.00  6.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00    1 





Country Control  CF  Widely  Family  State  Fin  Corp  Other    N 
  Panel B:  Group means          
  
Low  rights  39.13  32.20 0.17 0.38 0.21  0.10  0.01  0.13    150 
High  rights  22.01  16.19 0.52 0.29 0.14  0.02  0.01  0.03    94 
Low  official  30.94  26.21 0.26 0.27 0.22  0.09  0.01  0.15    117 
High  official  34.08  25.87 0.34 0.41 0.14  0.05  0.02  0.05    127 
Low  restrict  28.17  21.03 0.35 0.31 0.11  0.11  0.02  0.12    123 
High  restrict  37.05  31.12 0.26 0.38 0.26  0.03  0.01  0.07    121 
Low  independence  39.27  31.94 0.15 0.37 0.24  0.10  0.00  0.13    107 
High  independence  27.34  21.42 0.42 0.32 0.13  0.04  0.02  0.07    137 
Low  capital  33.42  26.96 0.27 0.37 0.19  0.08  0.01  0.08    139 
High  capital  31.45  24.80 0.34 0.30 0.17  0.06  0.01  0.11    105 
  Panel C:  Test of means          
  
Low versus high rights  ***4.45 ***4.83 ***-5.90 1.51 1.40  ***2.74 0.19 ***3.05   244 
Low versus high official  -0.80 0.09 -1.25 **-2.26 1.62  1.42 -0.51 ***2.60   244 
Low versus high restrict  **-2.27 ***-2.91 1.59 -1.17 ***-3.10  **2.25 0.57 1.50   244 
Low versus high independence  ***3.07 ***3.02 ***-5.00 0.85 **2.20  *1.72 *-1.74 *1.67   244 









Valuation, shareholder rights, and bank supervision 
 
This table classifies countries according to their ranking in shareholder rights. Panel A presents medians by country of the 
index of shareholder rights, the bank regulatory variables, market-to-book value and Tobin’s Q ratio. The sample includes 
the ten largest publicly traded banks in terms of total assets in each country at the end of December 2001, when available. 
The number of banks is 244. Panel B reports group medians for low and high values for shareholder rights and the bank 
regulatory variables. Panel C reports test of medians for low versus high values for shareholder rights and the bank 
supervision variables. Table I defines the variables. * Significant at 10 percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. *** 
Significant at 1 percent level. 
Country Rights  Official  Restrict  Independence Capital  Market-to-book Tobin’s  Q
 
Panel A: Medians 
Argentina 4  11  9  1  3  0.94  0.99 
Australia 4  11  8  4  3  2.04  1.08 
Austria 2  13  5  1  5  1.34  1.02 
Brazil 3  14  10  1  5  1.53  1.04 
Canada 5  6  7  4  4  1.44  1.02 
Chile 5  10  11  1  3  2.28  1.10 
Colombia 3          0.97  1.00 
Denmark 2  8  8  1  2  0.98  1.00 
Egypt 2  12  13  4  3  0.73  0.98 
Finland 3  8  7  1  4  1.06  1.00 
France 3  7  6  3  2  1.19  1.01 
Germany 1  10  5  4  1  0.73  0.99 
Greece 2  10  9  1  3  1.84  1.07 
Hong Kong  5          0.92  0.99 
India 5  8  10  3  3  0.49  0.97 
Indonesia 2  12  14  2  5  0.88  0.99 
Ireland 4  9  8  4  1  1.69  1.04 
Israel 3  8  13  2  3  0.75  0.99 
Italy 1  6  10  2  4  1.15  1.01 
Japan 4  12  13  3  4  1.30  1.01 
Jordan 1    11    5  1.07  1.01 
Kenya 3  14  10  2  4  0.51  0.90 
Korea Rep. Of  2  9  9  2  3  1.04  1.00 
Malaysia 4  11  10  3  3  1.24  1.03 
Mexico 1  9  12  1  4  0.97  1.00 
Netherlands 2  8  6  4  3  1.73  1.03 
Norway 4          0.67  0.97 
Pakistan 5          0.66  0.98 
Peru 3  12  8  3  3  0.54  0.96 
Philippines 3  11  7  1  1  0.73  0.95 
Portugal 3  13  9  4  3  1.38  1.02 
Singapore 4  3  8  3  1  1.56  1.06 
South Africa  5  4  8  2  4  1.62  1.04 
Spain 4  9  7  3  4  2.21  1.07 





Country Rights  Official  Restrict  Independence Capital  Market-to-book Tobin’s  Q
 
Panel A: Medians 
Sweden 3  6  9  3  3  1.70  1.03 
Switzerland 2  13  5  3  3  2.39  1.05 
Taiwan 3  8  12  2  2  0.89  0.99 
Thailand 2  10  9  2  4  1.24  1.01 
Turkey 2  11  12  4  1  1.49  1.03 
United Kingdom  5  11  5  4  3  2.34  1.06 
United States  5  13  12  4  4  2.14  1.09 
Venezuela 1  13  10  3  3  0.86  0.98 
Zimbabwe 3          3.60  1.18 
Country mean  3.09  9.84  9.03  2.55  3.05  1.30  1.02 
 
Panel B: Group medians 
Low rights  2         1.00 1.00 
High rights  5         1.47 1.03 
Low official    8        1.22  1.01 
High official    12        1.18  1.01 
Low restrict      8      1.43  1.02 
High restrict      12      0.98  1.00 
Low independence        2    1.00  1.00 
High independence        4    1.41  1.02 
Low capital          3  1.10  1.01 
High capital          4  1.24  1.02 
 
Panel C: Test of Medians (z-statistic) 
Low versus high rights  ***-13.49 ***-3.86 ***-4.31
Low versus high official  ***-12.78 -0.15 0.23
Low versus high restrict  ***-12.94 ***3.71 ***3.14
Low versus high independence  ***-13.14 ***-3.29 ***-3.13








Investor protection and valuation of banking firms 
 
Sample of 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Dependent variable is market-to-book 
value of the bank’s equity of a bank. Loan growth is the bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Rights is 
an index of anti-director rights for the country. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the 
controlling owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. State is a dummy variable that indicates whether the state is 
the controlling shareholder in the bank. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. All bank-level data are for the year 
2001. Columns (1)-(2) are estimated using OLS. Columns (3)-(4) are estimated using random country-effects. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The Breusch-Pagan (1980) test is a Lagrange multiplier test of independent errors 
within countries. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan  growth  0.266 0.269 0.086 0.076 
  (0.379) (0.364) (0.325) (0.326) 
Rights  0.308*** 0.304*** 0.218*** 0.217** 
  (0.055) (0.056) (0.085) (0.085) 
CF  2.267*** 2.318*** 1.515*** 1.553*** 
  (0.596) (0.602) (0.566) (0.572) 
CF  *  Rights  -0.889*** -0.864*** -0.580*** -0.577*** 
  (0.153) (0.164) (0.182) (0.182) 
State   -0.165   -0.070 
   (0.125)   (0.137) 
      
Breusch-Pagan test: χ
2-statistic    47.25  45.50 
Breusch-Pagan test: p-value      0.000  0.000 
Observations  213 213 213 213 
R-squared  0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 








Investor protection, bank supervision, and valuation of banking firms 
 
Sample of 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Dependent variable is market-to-book 
value of the bank’s equity of a bank. Loan growth is the bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Rights is 
an index of anti-director rights for the country. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the 
controlling owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. State is a dummy variable that indicates whether the state is 
the controlling shareholder in the bank. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Official is an index of official 
supervisory power. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. Independence is an index of overall supervisory 
independence. Capital is an index of capital regulation. All bank-level data are for the year 2001. Regressions are 
estimated using random country-effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan  growth  -0.113 -0.043 -0.143 0.001 
 (0.349)  (0.335)  (0.348)  (0.336) 
State  -0.197 -0.138 -0.200 -0.166 
 (0.156)  (0.147)  (0.156)  (0.145) 
CF  1.929*** 1.893*** 1.954*** 1.734*** 
 (0.624)  (0.601)  (0.624)  (0.603) 
Rights  0.296*** 0.282*** 0.279*** 0.283*** 
 (0.085)  (0.080)  (0.089)  (0.077) 
CF * Rights  -0.689***  -0.682***  -0.688***  -0.644*** 
 (0.202)  (0.196)  (0.202)  (0.195) 
Official 0.018       
 (0.033)       
Restrict   -0.036    
   (0.035)    
Independence     0.053   
     (0.085)   
Capital     0.100 
     (0.067) 
      
Observations  187 194 187 194 







Controlling for moral hazard 
 
Sample of 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Dependent variable is market-to-book 
value of the bank’s equity of a bank. Loan growth is the bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Rights is 
an index of anti-director rights for the country. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the 
controlling owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. State is a dummy variable that indicates whether the state is 
the controlling shareholder in the bank. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Official is an index of official 
supervisory power. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. Independence is an index of overall supervisory 
independence. Capital is an index of capital regulation. Moral hazard is an index of the generosity of the deposit insurance 
regime in the country. All bank-level data are for the year 2001. Regressions are estimated using random country-effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan  growth  -0.158 -0.190 -0.185 -0.174 
  (0.359) (0.351) (0.354) (0.357) 
State  -0.136 -0.067 -0.139 -0.131 
  (0.186) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) 
CF  1.679*** 1.719*** 1.711*** 1.695*** 
  (0.630) (0.624) (0.627) (0.639) 
Rights  0.272*** 0.238*** 0.266*** 0.268*** 
  (0.088) (0.092) (0.088) (0.086) 
CF * Rights  -0.653***  -0.653***  -0.667***  -0.662*** 
  (0.207) (0.205) (0.205) (0.209) 
Moral hazard  -0.051  -0.245 -0.093 -0.058 
  (0.143) (0.182) (0.097) (0.115) 
Official 0.025       
 (0.034)       
Official * Moralhazard 0.000       
 (0.014)       
Restrict   -0.059    
   (0.040)    
Restrict * Moralhazard   0.020    
   (0.018)    
Independence     -0.009   
     (0.093)   
Independence * Moralhazard      0.018   
     (0.034)   
Capital     0.018 
     (0.090) 
Capital * Moralhazard        0.004 
     (0.035) 
      
Observations  155 155 155 155 










Sample of 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Dependent variable is market-to-book 
value of the bank’s equity of a bank. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the controlling 
owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. State is a dummy variable that indicates whether the state is the 
controlling shareholder in the bank. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Official is an index of official 
supervisory power. Restrict is an index of activity restrictions. Independence is an index of overall supervisory 
independence. Capital is an index of capital regulation. All bank-level data are for the year 2001. Regressions are 
estimated with instrumental variables using the Baltagi (1981) error component two-stage least square random-effects 
estimator. As instrument for CF we use the average CF of other banks in the country. We exclude countries with one 
bank. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State  -0.112 -0.078 -0.111 -0.109 
  (0.153) (0.144) (0.153) (0.143) 
CF  1.719*** 1.747*** 1.737*** 1.673*** 
  (0.639) (0.614) (0.636) (0.614) 
Rights  0.277*** 0.264*** 0.257*** 0.263*** 
  (0.081) (0.076) (0.083) (0.075) 
CF * Rights  -0.636***  -0.646***  -0.634***  -0.628*** 
  (0.213) (0.206) (0.213) (0.206) 
Official 0.022      
 (0.032)       
Restrict   -0.035    
   (0.033)    
Independence     0.054   
     (0.081)   
Capital     0.085 
     (0.063) 
      
Observations  213 220 213 220 
R-squared  0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 








Additional country-level controls 
 
Sample of 10 largest listed banks in the country in terms of total assets, if available. Dependent variable is market-to-book 
value of the bank’s equity of a bank. Loan growth is the bank’s average net loan growth during the last 3 years. Rights is 
an index of anti-director rights for the country. CF is the fraction of the bank’s ultimate cash-flow rights held by the 
controlling owners and zero if there is no controlling owner. State is a dummy variable that indicates whether the state is 
the controlling shareholder in the bank. We use 10 percent as the criteria for control. Per capita income is the log of GDP 
per capita. Enforce is an index of enforcement of contracts. Corrupt is an index of corruption. Law is a measure of law 
and order tradition. French legal origin is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a French legal 
origin, and zero otherwise. English legal origin is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has an English 
legal origin, and zero otherwise. All bank-level data are for the year 2001. Regressions are estimated using random 
country-effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Loan  growth 0.071 0.055 0.093 0.073 0.091 
  (0.325) (0.332) (0.327) (0.324) (0.328) 
State  -0.045 -0.077 -0.061 -0.056 -0.063 
  (0.137) (0.143) (0.137) (0.136) (0.138) 
CF  1.482*** 1.514**  1.535*** 1.510*** 1.531*** 
  (0.572) (0.608) (0.573) (0.570) (0.574) 
Rights  0.206** 0.215** 0.216** 0.200** 0.245** 
  (0.086) (0.089) (0.086) (0.086) (0.100) 
CF * Rights  -0.544***  -0.545***  -0.561*** -0.547*** -0.577*** 
  (0.183) (0.199) (0.184) (0.183) (0.183) 
Per capita income  0.098         
  (0.065)      
Enforce   0.070     
   (0.046)     
Corrupt    0.075    
    (0.099)    
Law     0.060*   
     (0.036)   
French  legal  origin      0.169 
      (0.238) 
English legal origin          -0.020 
      (0.271) 
       
Observations  213 207 213 213 213 
Number  of  countries  42 41 42 42 42 
 
  
 